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1: Introduction 
 
At its simplest the ‘social licence to operate’ (SLO) refers to an energy company’s’ obligations to 
achieve societal acceptance of their activities.1  SLO is an unwritten agreement between the company 
and communities (or stakeholders) in which societal support is required to enable the company’s 
legally-granted operations.  The SLO is in addition to the legal and/or environmental permit or licence 
granted to the energy company by the mineral or landholder.2   
 
While not exclusive to the natural resources sector,3 SLO is most commonly associated with the 
extractive industries.4  This association has been attributed to industry scrutiny due to the exploitative, 
and environmentally and socially damaging nature of natural resource exploration,5   
 
The SLO is often associated with the sites of activity and infrastructure location of energy projects.6  
In this paper, “energy projects” and “resources projects” are projects within the energy life cycle – 
from natural resource extraction to decommissioning, and include fossil fuels and low carbon energy 
                                                          
1 The term SLO is not restricted to the energy sector.  In this article, we use the term ‘energy companies’ to 
include upstream (resource extraction and exploitation including project development) and downstream (energy 
delivery).  
2 Jason Prno, ‘An analysis of factors leading to the establishment of a social licence to operate in the mining 
industry’ (2013) 38 Resources Policy 577; Emma Wilson, ‘What is the social licence to operate? Local 
perceptions of oil and gas projects in Russia’s Komi Republic and Sakhalin Island’ (2016) 3(1) The Extractive 
Industries and Society 73.  
3 Geert Demuijnck and Bjorn Fasterling, ‘The Social Licence to Operate’ (2016) 136 Journal of Business Ethics 
675; Richard Parsons, Justine Lacey & Kieren Moffat, ‘Maintaining legitimacy of a contested practice: How the 
minerals industry understands its ‘social licence to operate’ (2014) 41 Resources Policy 83. 
4 Kieren Moffat et al., ‘The social licence to operate: a critical review’ (2016) 89(5) Forestry 477; Geert 
Demuijnck and Bjorn Fasterling, ‘The Social Licence to Operate’ (2016) 136 Journal of Business Ethics 675. 
5 Ibid Moffat et al. (2016). 
6 See e.g., Rolf Wüstenhagen. Maarten Wolsink. Mary Jean Bürer. ‘Social acceptance of renewable energy 
innovation: An introduction to the concept’ (2007) 35(5) Energy Policy 2683; John Colton, et al., ‘Energy 
Projects, Social Licence, Public Acceptance and Regulatory Systems in Canada: A White Paper’ (2016) 
University of Calgary, The School of Public Policy, 9(20) SPP Research Papers, 34; Dan van der Horst, 
‘NIMBY or not? Exploring the relevance of location and the politics of voiced opinions in renewable energy 
siting controversies’ 35(5) Energy Policy 2705. 
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sources.7 However, SLO has also been used in terms of enabling entire industries to operate.  For 
example, the Australian Prime Minister recently stated, “The gas companies – I have no doubt – are 
very well aware they operate with the benefit of a social licence from the Australian people…And they 
cannot expect to maintain that if while billions of dollars of gas are being exported, Australians are 
left short.”8  This statement was made with regard to Australia’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
exporters choosing to export Australian gas rather than supply it to the domestic market.   
 
The failure to obtain an SLO can present operational risks that are detrimental to the success of energy 
projects.  Public opposition to resources projects has been linked to project cancellations,9 resulting in 
significant financial consequences (as will be highlighted in the case study of Columbia later).  A 
brief example, is the cancellation of a coal seam gas project in Queensland (attributed to public 
opposition) resulted in a pre-tax write down of $600 million.10  Given the magnitude of the 
consequences arising from a company’s failure to obtain an SLO, it is not surprising that the SLO is 
beginning to be considered as the key risk in the mining sector.  EY (the global accounting firm) ranks 
the SLO has number 4 in its 2016–2017 list of the top ten risks in the mining and minerals sector (it 
was ranked number 5 in the previous year).11   
 
In the context of the energy sector from a holistic perspective, a SLO may be needed for any type of 
energy activity across the energy life-cycle. It will increase the practice of justice in the energy sector 
and increases the practice of distributional, procedural, recognition and restorative justice, in essence 
the SLO can play a significant role in ensuring energy justice exists and is applied for a given energy 
activity. As identified in the literature, the SLO will mainly operate and exist when the energy activity 
or infrastructure is in operation and when it is then decommissioned.12 
 
While in some of the social science literature, the SLO is viewed as external to the legal system, , this 
notion is not entirely true, and it is fast emerging as a key legal contract (in a variety of forms) in 
order to begin operations for an energy company. Section 2 of this paper provides a brief introduction 
to the SLO construct. Section 3 examines the legal context of the SLO. Then a case study on the SLO 
and Columbia is presented and this provides significant originality in the exploration of this 
underexplored concept within energy literature. Columbia was chosen for three main reasons: (1) it 
represents a country from the Global South that has received limited attention in energy research; (2) 
it has significant mining resources and activities; and (3) there are unique but potentially far-reaching 
activities in relation to the SLO. Finally, the paper concludes and highlights the next steps forward for 
                                                          
7 See e.g., John Colton, et al., ‘Energy Projects, Social Licence, Public Acceptance and Regulatory Systems in 
Canada: A White Paper’ (2016) University of Calgary, The School of Public Policy, 9(20) SPP Research Papers, 
34. 
8 Paul Karp, ‘Gas companies risk 'social licence' by failing to supply domestic market, Turnbull says’ (14 March 
2017) ABC News <www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/mar/15/gas-companies-risk-social-licence-by-
failing-to-supply-domestic-market-turnbull-says> accessed 17 May 2017.  
9 See e.g., Financial Post Staff, ‘Arrested Development: A searchable database of billions of dollars in stalled or 
cancelled resource projects’ Financial Times (8 December 2016) 
<http://business.financialpost.com/news/energy/arrested-development-a-searchable-database-of-billions-worth-
of-stalled-blocked-and-cancelled-resource-projects> accessed 17 May 2017; ____, ‘Coal seam gas licences 
cancelled after AGL reaches buyback deal with NSW Government’ (6 July 2016) ABC News 
<www.abc.net.au/news/2015-07-06/agl-csg-licences-bought-back-hunter-sydney-illawarra/6597714> accessed 
17 May 2017; Bart W. Terwel, Emma ter Mors, Dancker D.L. Daamen, ‘It’s not only about safety: Beliefs and 
attitudes of 811 local residents regarding a CCS project in Barendrecht’ (2012) 9 International Journal of 
Greenhouse Gas Control 41. 
10 Peter Hannam, ‘AGL ditches Sydney CSG permit, but sticks with Gloucester project’ (6 July 2015) Sydney 
Morning Herald < www.smh.com.au/environment/agl-ditches-sydney-csg-permit-but-sticks-with-gloucester-
project-20150705-gi5s2c.html> accessed 17 May 2017. 
11 EY, ‘Top 10 business risks facing mining and metals, 2016–2017’ (2016) 
<www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-business-risks-in-mining-and-metals-2016-2017/%24FILE/EY-
business-risks-in-mining-and-metals-2016-2017.pdf>.  
12 Heffron & McCauley 
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the SLO in the energy sector and links back to how it is now becoming a key tool in increasing the 
practice and application of energy justice in the energy sector. 
 
The energy sector is increasingly aware of the need to ensure that practices are sustainable for the 
long term. This paper argues that SLO is the main mechanism for improving the sustainability of the 
extraction industries 13. Over 80% of the worlds energy sources come from fossil fuels that require 
sustainable extraction activities14. The emergence of modern renewable energy is also closely 
associated with a high demand in extracted materials for the construction of wind turbines for solar 
panels 15. The effective application of energy justice principles in the extractive industries offers a 
major opportunity to ensure social acceptability and long-term environmental protection.  
 
SLO is undeniably emerging as a key mechanism for achieving the successful application of energy 
justice. The energy justice framework encourages companies to consider the impact of their activities 
from a whole systems perspective16. It is not designed to reject or oppose ongoing activities such as 
the extractive industries. Its primary objective is to encourage existing activities such as extraction to 
be more socially and environmentally aware. This is achieved through the application of 
distributional, procedural, recognition and restorative principles. Energy companies and governments 
must work together to enforce these principles throughout energy systems. The extractive industries 
are often overlooked or underemphasized, in contrast to production oriented activities which often 
take place in more developed countries17. The SLO is the framework for delivering a more systematic 
compliance with these principles. 
 
We investigate the ways in which SLO can be used as a legal framework for the application of energy 
justice and long-term sustainability. The distributional dimension asks energy companies to consider 
the inequalities associated with the geographical location of their extractive activities. Considering 
evidence from other cases around the world18, more work is needed to ensure that extractive industries 
are sufficiently aware that the distribution of mining is taken into consideration when siting new 
activities 19. Legal scholarship has reinforced the need for explicit reflection on procedural dimensions 
when extractive industries approach communities who are hosting their operations20. Whilst there is 
evidence of improvements in this area, the case study on Columbia shows how companies could 
further improve their work in this area.  
 
Recognition justice challenges companies to consider the broader framework of human rights. This 
goes beyond simply ensuring that the correct processes of engagement with the community is enacted. 
The application of human rights is considered in detail with regards to the case study on Columbia 
below. And lastly, the extractive industries are increasingly cognizant of the need to actively involve 
themselves in restorative processes. Focus in the literature tends to be on the environment21. The SLO 
reminds us that restoration is equally needed for the affected societies. We assess the dimensions in 
                                                          
13 Sara Bice and Kieren Moffat, "Social Licence to Operate and Impact Assessment," Impact Assessment & 
Project Appraisal 32, no. 4 (2014). 
14 IEA, "World Energy Statistics 2016," (Paris2016). 
15 IRENA, "Remap: A Roadmap for a Renewable Energy Future," (Abu Dhabi2016). 
16 R. J. Heffron and D. McCauley, "Achieving Sustainable Supply Chains through Energy Justice," Applied 
Energy 123 (2014). 
17 BK Sovacool, "Countering a Corrupt Oil Boom: Energy Justice, Natural Resource Funds, and Sao Tome E 
Principe's Oil Revenue Management Law," Environmental Science & Policy 55 (2016). 
18 D. McCauley, Energy Justice: Re-Balancing the Trilemma of Security, Poverty and Climate Change 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2017). 
19 J. Prno, "An Analysis of Factors Leading to the Establishment of a Social Licence to Operate in the Mining 
Industry," Resources Policy 38, no. 4 (2013). 
20 R. Heffron and G. Little, eds., Delivering Energy Law and Policy in the Eu and Us (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2016). 
21 M. Hamilton, "Restorative Justice Activity Orders: Furthering Restorative Justice Intervention in an 
Environmental and Planning Law Context?," Environmental and Planning Law Journal 32, no. 6 (2015). 
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relation to the case study on Columbia, starting with a more detailed consideration of the current 
understanding of SLO in existing literature. 
 
 
2: What is the SLO? 
 
2.1: SLO in the Literature 
 
SLO describes the relationship between corporations and the communities and societies in which they 
operate.22  The literature distinguishes SLO as a societal licence from that of a legal licence granted 
under the law. As a societal licence, the SLO is viewed as being external to the legal permits and 
licences to conduct energy operations, in which the right to conduct operations are not granted by the 
state but rather are approved by the local community.23  According to this view, SLO is not a legal 
construct.  Instead, SLO is an unwritten obligation by an energy company to communities and society 
that exists without written legal authority.24 This reflects the literature on SLO to-date. It is only 
recently that legal scholars have turned their attention to this concept as there has been the realisation 
that it contributes to increased energy justice and also since it is taking the form of a legal contract. 
 
The SLO could trace its roots philosophically from Rousseau and Locke who both wrote on the 
‘social licence’, i.e. the concept of the social contract is where society supports ruling government 
activities when societal needs are met.25 In theory in the past scholars have viewed the social contract 
as sitting alongside the legal agreement/licence for exploration and exploitation activities. However, 
the SLO concept and its practice has suffered from not being well-defined. 
 
One scholar has attributed the term ‘SLO’ to Jim Cooney, a Canadian mining company executive, 
who first used it in 1997.26  Although the initial use of the phrase was metaphorical, it was 
subsequently adopted by the mining industry.27  And now while it has been in use over the past 20 
years, a standardised definition of SLO has yet to emerge.28  An example of some definitions of SLO 
include:  
 “the demands on and expectations for a business enterprise that emerge from neighborhoods, 
environmental groups, community members, and other elements of the surrounding civil 
society”29,  
 “a community’s acceptance or approval of a project or the project operator’s ongoing 
presence in the community”30;  
                                                          
22 Richard Parsons, Justine Lacey & Kieren Moffat, ‘Maintaining legitimacy of a contested practice: How the 
minerals industry understands its ‘social licence to operate’ (2014) 41 Resources Policy 83. 
23 Emma Wilson, ‘What is the social licence to operate? Local perceptions of oil and gas projects in Russia’s 
Komi Republic and Sakhalin Island’ (2016) 3(1) The Extractive Industries and Society 73. 
24 Emma Wilson, ‘What is the social licence to operate? Local perceptions of oil and gas projects in Russia’s 
Komi Republic and Sakhalin Island’ (2016) 3(1) The Extractive Industries and Society 73; Richard Parsons, 
Justine Lacey & Kieren Moffat, ‘Maintaining legitimacy of a contested practice: How the minerals industry 
understands its ‘social licence to operate’’ (2014) 41 Resources Policy 83. 
25 LD note: This idea is noted in Emma Wilson, ‘What is the social licence to operate? Local perceptions of oil 
and gas projects in Russia’s Komi Republic and Sakhalin Island’ (2016) 3(1) The Extractive Industries and 
Society 73.  She mentions Rousseau and cites a book that we do not have at QMUL. The book is by John 
Morrison, The Social License : How to Keep Your Organization Legitimate (2014, Palgrave Macmillan UK). 
26 See Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal 
System?’ (2016) 18 Flinders Law Journal 349, 350; Jason Prno, ‘An analysis of factors leading to the 
establishment of a social licence to operate in the mining industry’ (2013) 38 Resources Policy 577, 577.  
27 Robert G Boutilier, ‘Frequently asked questions about the social licence to operate’ (2014) 32(4) Impact 
Assessment and Project Appraisal 263, 263. 
28 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal System?’ 
(2016) 18 Flinders Law Journal 349, 355.  
29 Neil Gunningham, Robert A Kagan and Dorothy Thornton, ‘Social Licence and Environmental Protection: 
Why Businesses go Beyond Compliance’ (2004) 29(2) Law and Social Inquiry 307, 308. 
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 “exist[ing] when a mining project is seen as having the broad, ongoing approval and 
acceptance of society to conduct its activities”31. 
 
One can see that these three definitions all have a particular bias, with a focus in essence on a 
particular community. This article upon its review of the literature, the development of the energy 
sector and the provision of a case study will present a definition of the SLO. 
 
2.2: SLO and its Relationship with Similar Constructs 
 
A reason for the lack of an agreed conceptual definition of the SLO is because of its association with 
similar concepts related to the energy sector. is commonly associated with notions such as corporate 
social responsibility (CSR),32 social impact assessment,33 legitimacy,34 stakeholder engagement,35 
social contract theory36 and sustainability (or sustainable development) 37 and energy justice (more 
recently so)38. It is from this point that it can be determined that perhaps its meaning for the energy 
sector is not clear because scholars in the energy sector have not taken ownership over the term and 
how it applies in the energy sector and its importance. 
 
In terms of the latter associations, the SLO could be viewed as the outcome of these concepts and 
activities which could explain SLO’s close link with these terms. However, this is to ignore the 
‘activity’ of the SLO itself and its impact. For example, one perspective states that the SLO is the 
result of a company undertaking CSR, i.e. that is, where a company engages in CSR, the community 
may grant an SLO.39  The close association of these concepts are also observed in the New Zealand 
Sustainable Business Council’s observation of actions that support a SLO: “Having an easily 
communicable sustainability strategy and transparent, credible reporting can assist businesses to 
build trust, improve brand and reputation, realise opportunities and lower risk [to gain or maintain 
SLO]”.40 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
30 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal System?’ 
(2016) 18 Flinders Law Journal 349, 355. 
31 Jason Prno, ‘An analysis of factors leading to the establishment of a social licence to operate in the mining 
industry’ (2013) 38 Resources Policy 577, 577. 
32 Emma Wilson, ‘What is the social licence to operate? Local perceptions of oil and gas projects in Russia’s 
Komi Republic and Sakhalin Island’ (2016) 3(1) The Extractive Industries and Society 73; Jason Prno & D 
Scott Slocombe, ‘A Systems-Based Conceptual Framework for Assessing the Determinants of a Social License 
to Operate in the Mining Industry’ 53 Environmental Management 672; Richard Parsons, Justine Lacey & 
Kieren Moffat, ‘Maintaining legitimacy of a contested practice: How the minerals industry understands its 
‘social licence to operate’ (2014) 41 Resources Policy 83. 
33 Airong Zhang and Kieren Moffat, ‘A balancing act: The role of benefits, impacts and confidence in 
governance in predicting acceptance of mining in Australia’ (2015) 44 Resources Policy 25; Geert Demuijnck 
and Bjorn Fasterling, ‘The Social Licence to Operate’ (2016) 136 Journal of Business Ethics 675. 
34 Geert Demuijnck and Bjorn Fasterling, ‘The Social Licence to Operate’ (2016) 136 Journal of Business Ethics 
675. 
35 Richard Parsons, Justine Lacey & Kieren Moffat, ‘Maintaining legitimacy of a contested practice: How the 
minerals industry understands its ‘social licence to operate’ (2014) 41 Resources Policy 83; Geert Demuijnck 
and Bjorn Fasterling, ‘The Social Licence to Operate’ (2016) 136 Journal of Business Ethics 675. 
36 Geert Demuijnck and Bjorn Fasterling, ‘The Social Licence to Operate’ (2016) 136 Journal of Business Ethics 
675. 
37 John R Owen and Deanna Kemp, ‘Social licence and mining: A critical perspective’ (2013) 38 Resources 
Policy 29. 
38 Ibid, Heffron and McCauley, 2017. 
39 Robert Boutilier, ‘Untangling CSR and Similar Concepts’ (n.d.) Australian Centre for Corporate Social 
Responsibility (ACCSR) <http://accsr.com.au/untangling-csr-and-similar-concepts/> accessed 10 June 2017. 
40 New Zealand Sustainable Business Council, Social Licence to Operate Paper (2013) 2 
<https://www.sbc.org.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/99437/Social-Licence-to-Operate-Paper.pdf>. 
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However, it is through the concept of energy justice that the importance of the SLO concept to the 
energy sector is emerging.41 As stated earlier, the practice of the SLO has a close association with the 
core tenets of energy justice, i.e. procedural, distribution and recognition justice. The energy justice 
framework places the SLO in the development of energy infrastructure chain as per below in Figure 
X. New energy infrastructure can be built across the energy life-cycle (i.e. from extraction, to 
production, top operation, to supply and to waste management – from cradle to grave) and for each 
activity a SLO will be needed. As the case study of Colombia will show, even the poorest 
communities will no longer accept the behaviour of the past from energy companies, they want 
energy justice and they want it supported by the law (a legal “social contract” i.e. a written SLO). 
 
 
3: Developing the Legal Nature of the SLO  
 
3.1: Introduction 
 
In essence the main reason to develop the legal nature of the SLO is to ensure it can be enforced. Too 
often energy companies (particularly, Multinational Companies (MNCs)) have not delivered in the 
past and there are numerous examples. The SLO needs to be binding, and the energy companies need 
to be accountable and also stakeholders need to be able to hold energy companies accountable. 
However, the incorporation of SLO into the legal regime is challenging.   
 
The lack of standard definition and the fact SLO is not yet a legal construct brings to question issues 
of regulation and enforcement of an abstract notion. The legal foundation and legal treatment of 
factors that contribute to SLO are explored in this section. It has been highlighted already in academic 
literature that the ‘SLO’ has not been explored extensively in research.42  It has been suggested that 
SLO’s similarity to other concepts, such as social contract theory (and those listed in earlier in Section 
2), contributes to this lack of research on the concept.  In essence, to some degree, the SLO concept as 
has been researched, but under the auspices of other concepts.43   
 
Significantly it has been held that mere compliance with the legal licence and supporting laws – such 
as abiding by environmental laws or conducting environmental or social impact assessments – can be 
insufficient to establish a SLO.44  That is, a legal licence is not enough to guarantee the conduct of 
operations – a social licence, granted by the community, is now also required. The extra-judicial 
nature of SLO has led to criticism of the concept, with the assertion that it actually conflicts with the 
rule of law.45 In essence, does an SLO ask too much of an energy company? A Canadian think tank, 
has argued that SLO could be inconsistent with the notion of legal order: 
 
“Thinking of social licence to operate as a new quasi-legal requirement on companies, 
though, carries with it some extremely dangerous underlying assumptions. These become 
apparent as soon as one thinks again of what it measures: the risks of legal changes adverse to 
a business’s operations and of extra-legal disruptions of business activities.  To say that 
businesses operating in Canada should be subjected to a shifting social licence to operate is to 
say that businesses should face risks of legal changes that damage their business interests and 
of extra-legal disruption of their business activities by those opposed to them. To put it 
                                                          
41 As highlighted by Heffron & McCauley 
42 Geert Demuijnck and Bjorn Fasterling, ‘The Social Licence to Operate’ (2016) 136 Journal of Business Ethics 
675. 
43 Geert Demuijnck and Bjorn Fasterling, ‘The Social Licence to Operate’ (2016) 136 Journal of Business Ethics 
675. 
44 Jason Prno & D Scott Slocombe, ‘A Systems-Based Conceptual Framework for Assessing the Determinants 
of a Social License to Operate in the Mining Industry’ 53 Environmental Management 672.  
45 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal System?’ 
(2016) 18(2) Flinders Law Journal 349.  [LD note: Author cites other authors, which I have not cited 
secondarily here.] 
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bluntly, any overly enthusiastic embrace of social licence to operate in its mistakenly 
transformed senses is actually a rejection of the rule of law and a suggestion that Canada 
should become a less well-ordered society.” 46 
 
Macdonald-Laurier Institute – look up 
 
A similar view was expressed by the Business Council of British Columbia: 
 
“If an aggressive social campaign questions the legitimacy of a formal review process, then 
we have remedies, political and legal, to improve the review process.  We should not discard 
the formal process on the belief that direct civil action by public interest groups somehow 
represents a more democratically sound approach”.47 
 
However, the view that SLO is entirely separate to the law is not correct, it may have originated that 
way but it is fast becoming necessary and the views expressed above clearly have a corporate bias.   
Hence, although the SLO may be external to the legal licence for energy projects, the law, in fact, 
may give effect to the SLO particularly when one considers the increasing success and application of 
energy justice, and some related issues are explored below. 
   
3.2: Legal Regulation of SLO Factors  
 
The social science literature has identified a number of factors that enable an SLO.48  While 
standardised criteria are lacking, inferences can be made of minimum standards that support 
establishment and maintenance of an SLO.49  Here, several of these minimum standards that can be 
observed in legal governance of natural resource exploration and exploitation, and which support and 
maintain the SLO are explored: 
 
 Procedural Justice;   
 Mitigation of environmental and social harms/ Impact Assessments; 
 Recognition Justice; and 
 Enforcement/Perceived effectiveness of regulation and governance of resource activities. 
 
3.2.1: Procedural Justice  
 
Procedural justice is a common principle in the legal governance of energy development.   Procedural 
fairness in the process of community engagement in decision-making touches upon the democratic 
ideal of procedural due process (notice and the right to be heard).50  From a US jurisprudence 
perspective in the context of the natural resources industry, procedural due process protects citizens 
                                                          
46 Dwight Newman, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, ‘Commentary: Be Careful What You Wish For: Why Some 
Versions of “Social Licence” are Unlicensed and May be Anti-Social’ (November 2014) 3. 
47 Business Council of British Columbia, ‘Rethinking Social Licence to Operate – A Concept in Search of 
Definition and Boundaries’ (May 2015) 7(2) Environment and Energy Bulletin 1, 3. 
48 David Jijelava & Frank Vanclay, ‘Legitimacy, credibility and trust as the key components of a social licence 
to operate: An analysis of BP's projects in Georgia’ (2017) 140 Journal of Cleaner Production 1077, 1078; 
Kieren Moffat and Airong Zhang, ‘The paths to social licence to operate: An integrative model explaining 
community acceptance of mining’ (2014) 39 Resources Policy 61; Airong Zhang and Kieren Moffat, ‘A 
balancing act: The role of benefits, impacts and confidence in governance in predicting acceptance of mining in 
Australia’ (2015) 44 Resources Policy 25; Justine Lacey et al., ‘The art and science of community relations: 
Procedural fairness at Newmont's Waihi Gold operations, New Zealand’ (2017) 52 Resources Policy 245. 
49 David Jijelava & Frank Vanclay, ‘Legitimacy, credibility and trust as the key components of a social licence 
to operate: An analysis of BP's projects in Georgia’ (2017) 140 Journal of Cleaner Production 1077, 1078.   
50 Barry Barton, ‘Underlying Concepts and Theoretical Issues in Public Participation in Resources 
Development’ chapter 2 in Donald N Zillman, Alastair R Lucas and George (Rock) Pring, Human Rights in 
Natural Resource Development (2002 OUP).  
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from government acting arbitrarily, in secrecy, or without the participation of affected citizens.51 The 
idea of due process and public participation is also prominent in environmental law, which is essential 
to energy projects. Such due process was first proposed in 1987 in Our Common Future - Summary of 
Proposed Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development Adopted by 
the WCED Experts Group on Environmental Law (viewed as the document that set the foundation for 
the Rio Convention – Declaration on Environment and Development) (hereinafter referred to as Our 
Common Future).52  Due process is among the suggested environmental principles:  “States shall 
inform in a timely manner all persons likely to be significantly affected by a planned activity and to 
grant them equal access and due process in administrative and judicial proceedings” (emphasis 
added).53   
 
Community engagement is part of that ‘due process’, i.e. procedural justice. It has even been 
advanced that the requirement for community engagement in project decision making “may have 
attained the status of customary international law”54 due to its prominence.  For instance, access to 
justice – the right to challenge decisions and seek and obtain redress for harm – is provided in a 
number of international legal instruments that require access to remedies in the event of 
environmental harm.55  One such example is the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aahrus 
Convention).  This treaty has been incorporated into EU and Member State law through Directive 
2003/4EC and Regulation EC 1367/2006, which set out means to enable procedural and substantive 
justice in environmental decision making.56 Further the Aahrus Convention has been signed and 
ratified by by 39 countries to-date (UN, 1998). 
 
The Aarhus Convention has three key pillars that support procedural justice directly and indirectly 
facilitate the development of SLO:  (1) information access; (2) public participation in decision-making 
processes; and (3) access to justice in environmental matters.57 Access to information can empower 
the public to participate in decision making process and voice concerns about legal licences and 
community impacts,58  i.e. the legal licence requirements influence SLO outcomes.59   
 
The concept of public engagement in major energy projects can also be found in the permitting 
processes for energy projects of common interest (PCIs) under the EU’s Trans-European Energy 
                                                          
51 Robin Kundis Craig, ‘Due Process Challenges in Environmental and Natural Resources Law’ (2013) FSU 
College of Law, Public Law Research Paper, No. 453, 3. 
52 Barry Barton, ‘Underlying Concepts and Theoretical Issues in Public Participation in Resources 
Development’ chapter 2 in Donald N Zillman, Alastair R Lucas and George (Rock) Pring, Human Rights in 
Natural Resource Development (2002 OUP); see also United Nations, World Commission on Environment and 
Development, Our Common Future (1987) <www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf.>  
53 United Nations, World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (1987) article 6. 
54 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal System?’ 
(2016) 18(2) Flinders Law Journal 349, 365. 
55 George (Rock) Pring and Susan Y. Noé, ‘The Emerging International Law of Public Participation Affecting 
Global Mining, Energy, and Resources Development’ 11 in Donald N Zillman, Alastair R Lucas and George 
(Rock) Pring, Human Rights in Natural Resource Development (2002 OUP).  
5656 European Commission, ‘The Aarhus Convention: The EU & the Aarhus Convention: in the EU Member 
States, in the Community Institutions and Bodies’ (last updated 12 May 2017) 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/legislation.htm; see also European Commission, Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (2017) <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/pubs/pdf/factsheets/accesstojustice/en.pdf>. 
57 European Commission, ‘The Aarhus Convention: The EU & the Aarhus Convention: in the EU Member 
States, in the Community Institutions and Bodies’ (last updated 12 May 2017) 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/legislation.htm. 
58 Neil Gunningham, Robert A Kagan and Dorothy Thornton, ‘Social Licence and Environmental Protection: 
Why Businesses go Beyond Compliance’ (2004) 29(2) Law and Social Inquiry 307, 329. 
59 Neil Gunningham, Robert A Kagan and Dorothy Thornton, ‘Social Licence and Environmental Protection: 
Why Businesses go Beyond Compliance’ (2004) 29(2) Law and Social Inquiry 307, 329. 
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Infrastructure Regulation (TEN-E Regulation).60  This regulation provides a framework for 
development of energy infrastructure interconnectivity in Europe, such as electricity interconnectors 
and transboundary natural gas pipeline networks.  Annex VI of the TEN-E Regulation establishes 
Guidelines for Transparency and Public Participation.  As explained by the European Commission, 
the TEN-E Regulation, “recognises that transparency and early and effective involvement of the 
public is essential for complex infrastructure projects to be approved quickly and effectively”.61  A 
current example of the public engagement process under the TEN-E Regulation can be observed for 
carbon dioxide (CO2) transport projects, in which the European Commission commenced a public 
consultation on 24 May 2017.62 
 
A further issue in relation to procedural justice concerns land access. This issue concerns the the terms 
upon which the energy/resource company enters the land of the private landholder to undertake 
licenced exploration/exploitation activities – this issue is explored in more detail in relation to a case 
study on Columbia in section five..  The concept of fairness/due process is found in legislatively 
prescribed engagements between the natural resource company and community in land access 
legislation for energy projects, including the imposition of good faith negotiation standards.  For 
example, the Australian state of Queensland’s Land Access Code sets out as a general principle that 
both the landowner and resource company are to “liaise…in good faith” in the negotiation of land 
access terms.63  The requirement to negotiate in good faith is also found in Australia’s Native Title Act 
1993 (Cth), which governs access to Indigenous land.64  For example, section 31 of the Native Title 
Act addresses the negotiation procedure and provides that the “negotiation parties must negotiate in 
good faith…”65  
 
 
3.2.2: Impact Assessments 
 
Procedural fairness and public participation in decision making are also included in legislated 
processes for impact assessments (IAs) of major projects – both environmental (EIA) and social 
(SIA).  Through IAs, significant effects of projects are evaluated before government consent is issued 
so that strategies can be developed to minimise negative social and environmental impacts and 
maximise benefits.66 Two examples are considered below but it should be remembered that EIAs are 
now in operation in 100 countries worldwide and are now necessary to ensure finance for an energy 
project from the majority of lending institutions. 
 
The EU 
 
                                                          
60 Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on guidelines 
for trans-European energy infrastructure and repealing Decision No 1364/2006/EC and amending Regulations 
(EC) No 713/2009, (EC) No 714/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009 (TEN-E Regulation). 
61 European Commission, Guidance Document: Streamlining environmental assessment procedures for energy 
infrastructure Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) (24 July 2013) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/pdf/PCI_guidance.pdf.> 
62 European Commission, Energy, ‘Give your views on plans to build CO2 pipelines and reduce emissions’ (24 
May 2017) <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/give-your-views-plans-build-co2-pipelines-and-reduce-
emissions>. 
63 Queensland Government, Department of Natural Resources and Mines, ‘Land Access Code’ (September 
2016) Version 2 <www.dnrm.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/442633/land-access-code-2016.pdf>. The 
Code is promulgated under authority of section 36 of the Mineral and Energy Resources (Common Provisions) 
Act 2014 (QLD) 3. 
64 Australia Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) section 31; see also State of Queensland, Department of Natural 
Resources and Mines, ‘Guide to the Native Title Process’ (2015) 
<www.dnrm.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/362698/native-title-process-guideline.pdf>. 
65 Australia Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) section 31(1)(b).  
66 Airong Zhang and Kieren Moffat, ‘A balancing act: The role of benefits, impacts and confidence in 
governance in predicting acceptance of mining in Australia’ (2015) 44 Resources Policy 25. 
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The European Union issued the EIA Directive in 2014, which requires Member States to “adopt all 
measures necessary to ensure that, before consent is given, projects likely to have significant effects 
on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or location are made subject to a 
requirement for development consent and an assessment with regard to their effects”.67  Major 
projects subject to the EIA Directive include certain energy and natural resources works.68  
Legislative mandate for public engagement in the EIA process can be found at the Member State 
level, such as in the UK’s Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) 
Regulations 2011, UK legislation that governs EIAs, with application for natural resource 
developments.69  As explained by the UK government: “The aim of Environmental Impact Assessment 
is also to ensure that the public are given early and effective opportunities to participate in the 
decision making procedures”.70   
 
An SIA is now part of the EIA process and hence it is clear that a ‘social’ element or agreement is 
already legislated for. An example of this is in the legislation of the Australian state of Queensland.  
SIAs must be undertaken when environmental impact statements are required, and this includes 
resource projects.71 Five social issues related to natural resource projects are covered by the 
Queensland SIA process: 1) engagement with community and stakeholders; 2) workforce 
management; housing and accommodation; 3) local content; 4) health; and 5) community wellbeing.72   
 
The SIA is the foundation for the required social impact management plan, which formalises the 
actions for managing negative social impacts and maximising community benefits and contributes to 
creation of SLO.73 As explained by the Queensland government, “In Australian jurisdictions, there is 
strong industry support for the role of a ‘social licence to operate’ as a complement to the regulatory 
licence issued by government”, 74 and was described as “represent[ing] world best practice”. 75     
 
Not only is the process of engagement provided by IA legislation important, but also the robustness of 
IA governance is essential in establishing the SLO.  Research of the role of IAs in social acceptance 
of mining in Australia found that that public confidence in the governance of legislatively mandated 
IA processes (including compliance enforcement) was essential for the SLO of mining activities.76  
Confidence in the IA legal regime established a belief that industry would be held accountable for 
                                                          
67 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment 
of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, Article 2(1) (EIA Directive). 
68 EIA Directive, Annex II. 
69 UK Department for Communities and Local Government, ‘Guidance: Minerals’ (17 October 2014) 
<www.gov.uk/guidance/minerals>. 
70 UK Government, ‘Guidance: Environmental Impact Assessment’ (6 March 2014) 
<www.gov.uk/guidance/environmental-impact-assessment>. 
71 State of Queensland, Department State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, ‘Social Impact Assessment 
Guideline’ (July 2013) <http://statedevelopment.qld.gov.au/resources/guideline/social-impact-assessment-
guideline.pdf>; State Development and Public Works Organisation Act 1971 (Qld); Environmental Protection 
Act 1994 (Qld). 
72 State of Queensland, Department State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, ‘Social Impact Assessment 
Guideline’ (July 2013) 4 <http://statedevelopment.qld.gov.au/resources/guideline/social-impact-assessment-
guideline.pdf>. 
73 State of Queensland, Department of Infrastructure and Planning, ‘Social impact assessment: Guideline to 
preparing a social impact management plan’ (September 2010) 
<www.statedevelopment.qld.gov.au/resources/guideline/simp-guideline.pdf>.  
74 State of Queensland, Department of Infrastructure and Planning, ‘Social impact assessment: Guideline to 
preparing a social impact management plan’ 5 (September 2010) 
<www.statedevelopment.qld.gov.au/resources/guideline/simp-guideline.pdf>.  
75 State of Queensland, Department of Infrastructure and Planning, ‘Social impact assessment: Guideline to 
preparing a social impact management plan’ 5 (September 2010) 
<www.statedevelopment.qld.gov.au/resources/guideline/simp-guideline.pdf>.  
76 Airong Zhang and Kieren Moffat, ‘A balancing act: The role of benefits, impacts and confidence in 
governance in predicting acceptance of mining in Australia’ (2015) 44 Resources Policy 25. 
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negative social and environmental impacts of their projects, which facilitated public support of 
projects.   
 
Conversely, it has been asserted that the formalistic nature of the IA process is one that is inflexible 
and controlled by stakeholders external to the local community, which may hinder the establishment 
of the SLO.77 This inflexibility could mean that even though the community may object to the project, 
approval is granted because compliance with the assessment process is achieved.78 The formalistic 
nature may also reduce trust and engagement between the parties.79 Thus, while IAs may contribute to 
the SLO, the formal IA process set out in law may undermine the establishment of the SLO.  
However, contrary views highlight the importance of concerns of the local communities being 
addressed through formal IA processes for example,: “Citizens expect that the legislative and 
regulatory processes that are in place to protect the environment reflect their interests and values 
alongside the need to develop mineral and energy endowments for economic interest” (emphasis 
added).80 The failure of legal processes to support these citizen expectations could therefore hinder the 
development of a SLO. 
 
3.2.3: Recognition Justice: Human Rights 
 
Human rights considerations are also a factor in resource companies establishing and maintaining a 
SLO.  Human rights, in the context of a SLO and energy projects, are addressed in the law. Two ways 
in which human rights are addressed in the energy sector are through the legal concept of Free Prior 
Informed Consent (FPIC) and industry self-regulation efforts through the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights. 
 
Human rights as a foundation of SLO has been associated with the legal concept of FPIC.  FPIC seeks 
to address Indigenous people’s concerns about project impacts on their land, by empowering 
Indigenous landholders with the right to consent (or not) to the project activities.81  Such consent must 
be given freely and prior to project commencement.   
 
In exercising this right, indigenous groups have been encouraged to formally document their consent,  
for example:, “Indigenous peoples should express their consent in a formal, written agreement with 
the company or other formal documentation; [a]fter an indigenous community formally provides its 
consent, a company must continue to engage with the community in order to maintain that consent -- 
and, thus, the company’s social license to operate”.82   This notion is also found in Australia, in which 
agreements are delivered under the Native Title Act, including Indigenous Land Use Agreements.83  
 
                                                          
77 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal System?’ 
(2016) 18(2) Flinders Law Journal 349, 363. 
78 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal System?’ 
(2016) 18(2) Flinders Law Journal 349, 363. 
79 Sara Bice and Kieren Moffat, ‘Social licence to operate and impact assessment’ (2014) 32(4) Impact 
Assessment and Project Appraisal 257; Justine Lacey, ‘Can you legislate a social licence to operate?’(26 
February 2016) The Conversation <http://theconversation.com/can-you-legislate-a-social-licence-to-operate-
10948>. 
80 Airong Zhang and Kieren Moffat, ‘A balancing act: The role of benefits, impacts and confidence in 
governance in predicting acceptance of mining in Australia’ (2015) 44 Resources Policy 25, 32. 
81 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal System?’ 
(2016) 18(2) Flinders Law Journal 349, 354. 
82 Amy K. Lehr & Gare A. Smith, Foley Hoag LLP, Implementing a Corporate Free, Prior, and Informed 
Consent Policy: Benefits and Challenges (July 2010, Foley Hoag eBook) 9 http://solutions-network.org/site-
fpic/files/2012/09/Implementing-a-Corporate-Free-Prior-Informed-Consent-Foley-Hoag.pdf. 
83 See e.g., Australia Government, ‘Indigenous Land Use Agreements’ <www.austrade.gov.au/land-
tenure/Native-title/indigenous-land-use-agreements> accessed 31 May 2017.  
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FPIC can also be found in international documents, such as the International Labour Organisation’s 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989,84 and in the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (2007).85 Further, FPIC is observed in self-regulatory efforts as well, such as in 
CSR efforts, in which companies voluntarily incorporate human rights in their CSR frameworks.86  
FPIC has also been described as more clearly defined and easily understandable than SLO,87 and is 
“ensconced in international law”.88   
 
However, FPIC is also more narrow than SLO.  First, FPIC is described as an acute or distinct action 
(one-off), whereas SLO requires continued community support that spans the life of an energy 
project89 when in operation and the decommissioning phase. Second FPIC typically applies to 
engagements with indigenous peoples – being an indigenous right – 90 rather than a right that applies 
to other groups as is the case with SLO.91  However, it should be noted that, FPIC has been extended 
beyond the context of rights of Indigenous people.92  For example, the Economic Community of 
African States (ECOWAS) incorporated the FPIC principle in its 2009 Directive on the 
Harmonization of Guiding Principles and Policies in the Mining Sector. There FPIC is a state 
obligation (extended to private entities acting for the state), whereas SLO extends to private 
enterprises.93   
 
Finally, distinction is also made between the FPIC principle and legal consent. While energy projects 
are authorised under a legal licence or permit, societal endorsement or approval – that is, consent of 
the public – is also required for operations to occur.94  However, “[i]t has been observed that 
companies are averse to speak of consent because of the capacity of the term to give substantial 
power to their host communities; they are therefore unwilling to equate social licence with 
‘community consent’.” 95 
 
                                                          
84 International Labour Organisation, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989, Article 16; see also 
Toyah Rodhouse & Frank Vanclay, ‘Is free, prior and informed consent a form of corporate social 
responsibility?’ (2016) 131 Journal of Cleaner Production 785. 
85 See also Philippe Hanna & Frank Vanclay, ‘Human rights, Indigenous peoples and the concept of Free, Prior 
and Informed Consent’ (2013) 31(2) Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 146, 147; Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can 
the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal System?’ (2016) 18 Flinders Law 
Journal 349. 
86 Toyah Rodhouse & Frank Vanclay, ‘Is free, prior and informed consent a form of corporate social 
responsibility?’ (2016) 131 Journal of Cleaner Production 785. 
87 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal System?’ 
(2016) 18 Flinders Law Journal 349. 
88 Sara Bice, ‘What Gives You a Social Licence? An Exploration of the Social Licence to Operate in the 
Australian Mining Industry’ (2014) 3 Resources 62, 74. 
89 Toyah Rodhouse & Frank Vanclay, ‘Is free, prior and informed consent a form of corporate social 
responsibility?’ (2016) 131 Journal of Cleaner Production 785, 789 
90 Amy K. Lehr & Gare A. Smith, Foley Hoag LLP, Implementing a Corporate Free, Prior, and Informed 
Consent Policy: Benefits and Challenges (July 2010, Foley Hoag eBook) 9 http://solutions-network.org/site-
fpic/files/2012/09/Implementing-a-Corporate-Free-Prior-Informed-Consent-Foley-Hoag.pdf. 
91 Business Council of British Columbia, ‘Rethinking Social Licence to Operate – A Concept in Search of 
Definition and Boundaries’ (May 2015) 7(2) Environment and Energy Bulletin 1, 3 
<www.bcbc.com/content/1708/EEBv7n2.pdf>. 
92 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal System?’ 
(2016) 18(2) Flinders Law Journal 349, 366. 
93 Business Council of British Columbia, ‘Rethinking Social Licence to Operate – A Concept in Search of 
Definition and Boundaries’ (May 2015) 7(2) Environment and Energy Bulletin 1, 3 
<www.bcbc.com/content/1708/EEBv7n2.pdf>;Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate 
Find its Way into the Formal Legal System?’ (2016) 18 Flinders Law Journal 349. 
94 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal System?’ 
(2016) 18(2) Flinders Law Journal 349, 357. 
95 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal System?’ 
(2016) 18(2) Flinders Law Journal 349, 357. 
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Another mechanism that addresses human rights in energy project activities is the Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights.96  The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
are described as “the only human rights guidelines designed specifically for extractive sector 
companies”.97 The Voluntary Principles, established by a consortium of governments, corporations 
and nongovernmental organisations, promote human rights standards to be used by security forces in 
the natural resources sector.98 Companies then incorporate these principles into their operating 
standards, which provides a means of industry self-regulation (an idea which is explored later in this 
paper).   
 
3.2.4: Distributional Justice: Legal Agreements and SLO 
 
While the SLO is not established through a formal agreement between communities and project 
developers,99 contracts can be used to document the conditions for the resource company’s SLO, and 
thereby provide tangibility to the SLO construct.100  These agreements typically address key SLO 
themes such as human rights, environment and social concerns,101 and address compensation and 
distribution of benefits.102  The execution of these contracts by communities is viewed as a 
measurement of community support for resource company activities, providing tangibility to the SLO 
concept.103 
 
The implementation of contracts for SLO in the natural resources sector has been described as an 
evolution in law.  It is one in which contract law has expanded beyond protection of investor rights to 
include consideration of communities impacted by natural resource operations104 as outlined below:  
 
“This contemporary contractual landscape shows that the law of contract in the extractive 
industries context cannot in the twenty-first century continue to be based on legal theories 
developed in the nineteenth century according to which ‘any private actor who is good 
enough to open his property to the public by putting it into the lines of commerce should not 
be discouraged by imposing even the most limited of social duties on his conduct’.105  
 
According to this view, social order and the rights of groups are inherent aspects of international 
human rights law, emphasising the rights of groups and the collective rather than rights of individual.. 
                                                          
96 Australian Government, Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, Resources section 4.4 
<https://industry.gov.au/resource/Programs/LPSD/Community-engagement-and-development/Best-
practice/Pages/Business-and-human-rights.aspx> accessed 31 May 2017. 
97 Voluntary Principles on Human Rights at www.voluntaryprinciples.org/ accessed 31 .May 2017. 
98 Australian Government, Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, Resources section 4.4 
<https://industry.gov.au/resource/Programs/LPSD/Community-engagement-and-development/Best-
practice/Pages/Business-and-human-rights.aspx> accessed 31 May 2017.  
99 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal System?’ 
(2016) 18 Flinders Law Journal 349, 356. 
100 John R Owen and Deanna Kemp, ‘Social licence and mining: A critical perspective’ (2013) 38 Resources 
Policy 29. 
101 James Gathii and Ibironke T Odumosu-Ayanu, ‘The Turn to Contractual Responsibility in the Global 
Extractive Industry’ (2015) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 69. 
102 John R Owen and Deanna Kemp, ‘Social licence and mining: A critical perspective’ (2013) 38 Resources 
Policy 29. 
103 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal 
System?’ (2016) 18 Flinders Law Journal 349, 371; John R Owen and Deanna Kemp, ‘Social licence and 
mining: A critical perspective’ (2013) 38 Resources Policy 29. 
104 James Gathii and Ibironke T Odumosu-Ayanu, ‘The Turn to Contractual Responsibility in the Global 
Extractive Industry’ (2015) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 69, 71. 
105 James Gathii and Ibironke T Odumosu-Ayanu, ‘The Turn to Contractual Responsibility in the Global 
Extractive Industry’ (2015) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 69, 71, quoting Ira Nerken, ‘A New Deal for 
the Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Challenging the Doctrinal Bases of the Civil Rights Cases and 
State Action Theory’ (1977) 12 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 297, 332. 
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106  Another view is that community contracts have evolved as a mechanism to overcome the 
challenge of defining and measuring compliance of SLO in the natural resources sector through legal 
regulation.107 
 
While CDAs provide a means of tangibility for the conditions giving rise to a SLO, mere contractual 
compliance alone is not in itself sufficient to deliver and maintain a SLO:  
 
“Issues may arise, for example, that fall outside an agreement that cause angst, anger and 
concern to parties to the agreement. It is the organisation’s response to these additional issues 
that also determine whether or not their apparent ‘social licence’ is maintained. Conversely, 
breaches of agreement conditions may not necessarily diminish the so-called ‘social licence’ 
if a company responds appropriately. For instance, if a company inadvertently damages 
cultural heritage but responds by way of immediate and respectful notification to elders, 
accepts fault and provides an apology, compensation or other acceptable measures in 
alignment with the terms codified in the agreement”.108   
 
 
4: SLOs in the Law  
 
4.1: Community Development Agreements 
 
SLO contracts, while typically called Community Development Agreements (CDAs),109 are known by 
many names.110   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 presents commonly used names for CDAs.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
106 James Gathii and Ibironke T Odumosu-Ayanu, ‘The Turn to Contractual Responsibility in the Global 
Extractive Industry’ (2015) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 72. 
107 John R Owen and Deanna Kemp, ‘Social licence and mining: A critical perspective’ (2013) 39 Resources 
Policy 29, 33. 
108 John R Owen and Deanna Kemp, ‘Social licence and mining: A critical perspective’ (2013) 38 Resources 
Policy 29, 33. 
109 World Bank, Mining Community Development Agreements: Source Book (March 2012, The World Bank) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/mining_community.pdf>; James Gathii and Ibironke 
T Odumosu-Ayanu, ‘The Turn to Contractual Responsibility in the Global Extractive Industry’ (2015) 1 
Business and Human Rights Journal 69, 72. 
110 World Bank, Mining Community Development Agreements: Source Book (March 2012, The World Bank) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/mining_community.pdf>. 
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Table 1: CDA Nomenclature111 
 
 Benefits Sharing Agreements (Chile) 
 Community Contracts 
 Community Development Agreements 
 Community Development Initiatives 
 Community Joint Venture Agreements 
 Empowerment Agreements 
 Exploration Agreements 
 Investment Agreements (Mongolia) 
 Impact Benefit Agreements (Canada) 
 
 
 Indigenous Land Use Agreements (Australia) 
 Landowner Agreements 
 Participation Agreements 
 Partnership or Partnering Agreements  
 Protocol Agreements 
 Shared Responsibilities Agreements 
 Social Trust Funds (Peru) 
 Voluntary Agreements  
Source: Constructed by the Authors (2017) from – (Mining Community 
Development Agreements, 2010, World Bank, 2012; Wright and Wright, 2012). 
 
These agreements may be bilateral (between the investor and community) or tripartite (among the 
investor, state and community).112 Establishment of the community agreement may be initiated 
voluntarily by the energy/resource company. 113 Given many CDAs are confidential, they are not 
readily accessible.  However, two examples of CDAs that may be reviewed online include: Argyle 
Diamond Mine Participation Agreement (Australia) and the Ahafo Social Responsibility Agreement 
(Ghana).114   (Gathii and Odumosu-Ayanu, 2015; Cameron and Correa, 2002, Ahafo Social 
Responsibility Agreement, 2011; Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement). While a standard 
model CDA is yet to be seen, some general practices can be found in the accessible examples that are 
applicable across jurisdictions and communities (Loutit et al., 2016). 
  
Several benefits are associated with the negotiated SLO contracts, such as: increased transparency in 
distribution of benefits and clarity of stakeholder roles and expectations, increased engagement and 
communication between the parties, empowering communities, improving CSR and sustainability 
                                                          
111 Constructed by author using Environmental Resources Management, ‘Mining Community Development 
Agreements – Practical Experiences and Field Studies: Report for The World Bank’ (June 2010) 16 
<http://www.sdsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/CDA-Report-FINAL.pdf>; World Bank, Mining Community 
Development Agreements: Source Book (March 2012, The World Bank) 5 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/mining_community.pdf>;Laura Wright and Jerry P 
Wright, ‘Developing Oil and Gas Resources On or Near Indigenous Lands in Canada: An Overview of Laws, 
Treaties, Regulations and Agreements’ (August 2012) 3(2) The International Indigenous Policy Journal Art. 5, 
10. 
112 James Gathii and Ibironke T Odumosu-Ayanu, ‘The Turn to Contractual Responsibility in the Global 
Extractive Industry’ (2015) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 69. 
113 World Bank, Mining Community Development Agreements: Source Book (March 2012, The World Bank) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/mining_community.pdf>. 
114 Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement, <www.atns.net.au/objects/Agreements/Argyle%20MP.pdf>; 
Ahafo Social Responsibility Agreement (2011) < http://www.sdsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Ahafo-
Social-Responsibility-Agreement.pdf>; see also James Gathii and Ibironke T Odumosu-Ayanu, ‘The Turn to 
Contractual Responsibility in the Global Extractive Industry’ (2015) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 69, 
87; Peter D Cameron and Ernesto Correa, ‘Towards the Contractual Management of Public-Participation Issues: 
A Review of Corporate Initiatives’ in Donald N Zillman, Alastair R Lucas and George (Rock) Pring (eds), 
Human Rights in Natural Resource Development (2002 OUP). 
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outcomes.115  However, the agreement itself is not sufficient to maintain SLO—implementation and 
management of the contract also have important roles in continuance of the SLO.116   
While resource companies may be required by law to put CDAs in place, the regulation may not 
extend to the specific contents of the CDA.117 In addition (and as noted above), the agreement’s 
provisions may be confidential. This lack of transparency may give the resource company an 
advantage in negotiation of future CDAs opposite community counterparties.118 CDAs set out rights 
and obligations of the parties, including dispute resolution procedures.  Breach of the agreement 
would give rise to a claim by one of the contracting parties. Interestingly, the MMDA,119 proposes 
that material breach of a CDA should be linked to the mineral licence awarded by the government to 
the resource company.120 This would enable a tripartite engagement, resulting in government 
intervention in CDA disputes, and linking the SLO as embodied in the CDA to the government 
licence.121   
 
4.2: CDAs in Primary Law 
 
Recognition of the importance of societal and community considerations in the development of major 
resource projects can be found in the law. In many cases, the requirements for CDAs are established 
in legislation, and can be found in jurisdictions such as Canada and Australia (regarding indigenous 
peoples) and a number of African nations (such as Nigeria, Kenya and Mozambique).122   
 
The International Bar Association initiated the Model Mining Development Agreement (MMDA) 
project in 2009 to establish a standardised mining agreement.123 The MMDA is intended for use 
between mining companies and host governments, particularly of developing nations where mining 
laws are not well established or well implemented.124 As explained on the MMDA’s website, the 
mining contract extends beyond the requirements of the two contracting parties.   
 
“While the project clearly recognizes that a mining development must be commercially viable 
to proceed, it also recognizes this is no longer the only issue around which contract 
negotiations should proceed. Rather, all parties to a negotiation should take a broader, and 
                                                          
115 World Bank, Mining Community Development Agreements: Source Book (March 2012, The World Bank) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/mining_community.pdf>. 
116 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal 
System?’ (2016) 18 Flinders Law Journal 349; World Bank, Mining Community Development Agreements: 
Source Book (March 2012, The World Bank) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/mining_community.pdf>; see also Skylar Zilliox and 
Jessica M Smith, ‘Memorandums of understanding and public trust in local government for Colorado’s 
unconventional energy industry’ (2017) 107 Energy Policy 72, 75, noting importance of agreement 
implementation not just establishment of the agreement itself. 
117 Laura Wright and Jerry P Wright, ‘Developing Oil and Gas Resources On or Near Indigenous Lands in 
Canada: An Overview of Laws, Treaties, Regulations and Agreements’ (August 2012) 3(2) The International 
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integrated, look at the relationship between the proposed project, the state and the local 
communities. The natural, social and economic environments around mining projects are also 
essential considerations today… it seeks to provide an agenda for negotiations based on a 
sustainable development objective that is common to all parties. Its public nature will also 
allow local communities and civil society groups to contribute in a sound manner to 
negotiation processes. By setting out a comprehensive and common template, it is hoped the 
project will enable and assist better structured negotiations, and better lasting results in 
mining projects”. 125 
The model agreement contains provisions that address CDAs.  Under the MMDA, the proposed scope 
of CDAs includes: distribution of benefits from project, mitigation of adverse impacts, how local 
development spend will be made, addressing environmental, social, and economic conditions both 
during and after project operations.126   
 
4.3: Agreements between Local Governments and Mining Companies 
 
A recent development has occurred in the U.S. state of Colorado that could be viewed as a type of 
CDA—Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). Unconventional gas exploration and drilling is 
regulated at the state level in Colorado. However, such industry activity is not universally supported at 
the state level127. The Colorado Supreme Court has confirmed that state law pre-empts local regulation 
of unconventional gas.128 However, in an effort to have some control over local level activities, local 
governments have entered into MOUs with unconventional gas companies. The MOU make 
operations subject to local regulations through a contractual mechanism when the local governments 
do not have jurisdiction to legislate. Companies that enter into MOUs benefit from streamlined 
permitting129.  
 
These MOUs set out best management practices for unconventional gas development. One example is 
found in the MOU between the Town of Erie, Colorado and Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, dated 
28 August 2012, which establishes six best management practices are set out for unconventional gas 
development within the city limits.130 The best practices address: setback of operations from 
buildings, prior notice of activity to landowners within ½ mile of location of operations; mobilisation 
and demobilisation plans; traffic management, mitigation of noise, light and dust; reclamation plan; 
and certain technical requirements for drilling and operations.131 The communities and the oil and gas 
companies view the MOUs as a means to address community concerns and improve relationships 
between the parties.132  That is, they are a means of establishing an SLO.  
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Research on the effect of the MOU process revealed that the MOU improved the community’s trust of 
the local government, and not of the oil and gas company.  This is because ‘procedural justice’ was 
enhanced, with the MOU improving transparency and public engagement, as the local governance 
board “explicitly welcomed even critical public comments, made themselves available to citizens for 
conversations, and provided more information on the town website”.133 Interestingly, while these 
terms are established in the MOUs, tension still remains between the local communities and 
government and state governments.  For example, it has been reported the state regulator has refused 
to include MOU best practices in the Colorado state permits.  This has caused local governments and 
communities to question why the state would exclude points that are important to the local 
population.134 This highlights the tension between local regulation/community expectations and the 
authority of the distantly removed state regulator. 
 
Finally, MOUs have been used in Colombia, as well.  Both as public-private partnerships to address 
extreme poverty135 and as agreements between nations (Colombia as a coal producer and the 
Netherlands as the coal consumer).136 
 
4.4: Contract Duration Challenges 
 
The lengthy lifespan of energy projects can present intergenerational challenges for the SLO.  
Unanticipated issues may arise through the course of the contract and community values and priorities 
may change, which lead to reduced support for the energy company’s operations.137 For example, in 
the operations of a copper mine in Papua New Guinea, a SLO was lost across the generations.138  An 
agreement was established in 1967, however, subsequent generations in the local community were not 
supportive of the contract’s terms, viewing the distribution of funds under the contract to be 
inequitable as they favoured primary, but not secondary, landowners and this resulted in the mine 
been attacked in protest in 1988 and forcing its closure.139   
 
The issue of intergenerational SLO has been described as being best managed by ensuring continued 
support and consent throughout the contract’s life, rather than assuming consent is a one-time event at 
the signing of the contract.140 This suggests CDAs should have expiry dates, which would enable their 
renegotiation so that problems and modern community concerns could be addressed.141   
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4.5: SLO – Industry and Institutional Activities (Soft Law) 
 
Voluntary efforts of industry and institutions, are another means of supporting SLO.  These actions 
reveal another source of SLO governance through self-regulation– codes and standards that are not 
legally binding.  These ‘civil regulations’ have been described as industry self-regulation,142 which 
mitigates the need for government intervention and legally enforced regulation.143   
 
When government regulates or legislates company activity, a company’s non-compliance or breach of 
law could cause adverse publicity.  Non-compliance could lead to public rejection or rescission of the 
company’s SLO.144 Thus, the advantage of a self-regulated means of establishing a SLO is avoidance 
of regulatory compliance, enforcement and audits.145 However, industry self-regulation has been 
criticised for failing to establish uniformity in regulatory standards and for lacking mechanisms for 
enforcement.  This means not all companies will adopt the suggested standards, or they may be 
selective in the standards they adopt.146   
 
Self-regulation of energy industry activities that facilitate SLO, both through international 
collaboration and industry efforts, are briefly explored below in Tables  
Table 2 and Table 3 (Amend table numbers); it should be noted that these examples and the below 
discussion are not exhaustive.   
 
Table 2. Sample of International Initiatives  
Entity/Instrument SLO Aspect Brief Description 
Voluntary Principles  Human Rights Governments, Companies and NGOs that have 
established international standards for safety and 
security in extractive industry operations. 
Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative 
Transparency Global best practices standard for governance and 
transparency of the oil, gas and mineral resources 
sectors. 
U.N. Global Compact Human Rights Ten principles for sustainable corporate practices.  
Addresses human rights, labour, environment and 
anti-corruption. 
International Finance Corporation 
(World Bank) - Stakeholder 
Engagement: A Good Practice 
Handbook for Companies Doing 
Business in Emerging Markets 
Stakeholder 
Engagement 
Best practices for stakeholder engagement. 
Source: Constructed by the Authors (2017) (EITI Website; UN Global Compact; Voluntary Principles 
Website; IFC, 2007). 
Table 3 Sample of Industry and Sector Initiatives  
Sector Role Description 
Shale Gas 
Center for Responsible Shale 
Development (CRSD) 
Standard Setting and Certification Certify companies against 
established standards. 
Equitable Origin (EO)147 Benchmark and measure Assist companies in 
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benchmarking performance 
against EO’s proprietary standards 
for energy projects. 
Not shale gas specific. 
Mining 
International Council on Mining 
and Metals – 10 Principles  
Mining Industry Body in Australia Sustainable development 
principles that companies must 
agree to adopt as condition of 
MCA membership. 
Source: Constructed by the Authors (2017) (CRSD Website; ICMM Website). 
 
 
4.6: SLO and Self-Regulation – International Efforts 
 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are one means of self-regulation for CSR, which could lead to 
realisation of the SLO. Through PPPs, private and public sector entities collaborate to address social 
risks associated with energy/mining operations.148 Some international PPP examples include: the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, and the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI).   
 
The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human was mentioned previously in the context of human 
rights and SLO, which addresses security and safety in the conduct of operations in the extractive 
industry.   
 
The EITI, sets a global best practices standard for governance and transparency of the oil, gas and 
mineral resources sectors149; as noted previously, transparency is one key factor that facilitates the 
SLO.. The U.S. State Department in relation to the EITI has stated that (in 2014, the U.S. became the 
first G8 country to join the EITI): “… [The EITI] is a voluntary initiative through which countries 
commit to publish reports on how the government manages the oil, gas, and mining sectors. These 
reports include a reconciliation of revenues paid by extractive companies and revenues received by 
governments. The process is managed in each country by a multi-stakeholder group of government, 
civil society, and company representatives”.150 Therefore it is clear that there is an international 
initiative being taken towards the promotion of transparency and accountability in the resource 
extraction industry to allow countries, particularly developing countries to benefit from the 
exploitation of their resources (Kasekende et al.,2016). 
 
4.7: SLO and Self-Regulation – Industry Efforts 
 
Self-regulatory initiatives have also been undertaken by industry bodies, which seek to influence the 
SLO for the extractive industry. Consider, for example, the Australian mining industry’s trade 
organisation – the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) – position on SLO:  
  
“The Australian minerals industry strongly supports the role of a ‘social licence to operate’ 
as a complement to a regulatory licence issued by government.  To the minerals industry 
‘social licence to operate’ is about operating in a manner that is attuned to community 
expectations and which acknowledges that businesses have a shared responsibility with 
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government, and more broadly society, to help facilitate the development of strong and 
sustainable communities”.151 
 
The MCA, as a means of industry self-regulation, has established sustainable development principles 
to which the Council’s members must abide for MCA membership.152 Based on the International 
Council on Mining and Metals’ 10 Principles,153 these principles of sustainable development can be 
observed to address factors associated with establishing and maintaining SLO, such as:  
 as upholding human rights (Principle 3); 
 continual improvement in environmental performance (Principle 6); and  
 social impact management in local communities (Principle 9).154   
 
The International Council on Mining and Metals’ 10 Principles have been benchmarked against 
several international standards: These include: the Rio Declaration, the Global Reporting Initiative, 
the Global Compact, OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, World Bank Operational 
Guidelines, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery, ILO Conventions 98, 169, 176, and the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights.155 
 
Several self-regulation efforts can also be observed in the U.S. shale gas industry, in which industry 
organisations establish best practices for shale gas operations.156 However, these are not without their 
critics.  One example of self-regulation in the U.S.’s shale gas sector can be observed in the Center for 
Responsible Shale Development (CRSD) (formerly known as the Centre for Sustainable Shale 
Development)- See Case Study in Box 1.157 The CRSD establishes industry standards performance 
standards and certifies company compliance with these standards.158 From this case study it is clear 
that self-regulation efforts have the potential to bring different stakeholders together and although the 
current aim of the Trump administration is to scale back on federal environmental regulations, we can 
see that companies continue to “feel the need to earn the social license to operate” (Waltz and LeGros, 
2017). 
 
Box 1. Center for Responsible Shale Development – Case Study 
 
The Centre for Responsible Shale Development (CSRD) is a non-profit organisation based in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania.  It has established 15 technical performance standards for environmental protection in shale 
gas development and certifies organisations as meeting those standards.  The CSRD describes itself as “an 
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alliance of energy producers and environmental organizations working together to demonstrate responsible 
stewardship of the environment and its resources”.159    
 
Shale gas operators may apply for CSRD certification, certifying they meet the 15 performance standards.  
Certified companies agree to be subjected to well site visits and ongoing reviews during the two-year 
certification period.  Reports on reviews and evaluations are available online, as a means of promoting 
transparency.  Shell and Chevron are among companies that have been received certification.   
 
CRSD evolved from the Shale Gas Roundtable group established in 2011.  The group established the Institute 
for Gas Drilling Excellence in 2012 to determine best practices for shale gas development in the region.  In 
2013, the Institute adopted the name Center for Sustainable Shale Development (CSSD).  The organisation 
was renamed the Center for Responsible Shale Development in 2016 in order to “better reflect its mission 
and enhanced stakeholder engagement”. 160 
 
The CRSD is not without controversy.  It has been accused of being a greenwashing activity, and criticised 
for having too close ties to the shale gas industry.161. And the organisation’s previous name was subject to 
critique – with the use of the word ‘Sustainable’ being questioned for appropriateness.162  Conversely, the 
CRSD has been lauded in the media as a promising self-regulatory effort that could “hasten the expansion of 
fracking by making drilling more acceptable to states and communities that feared the environmental 
consequences”.163 
 
4.8: Government Intervention when Self-Regulation is Insufficient  
 
Governments may intervene to improve industry self-regulation efforts. One example is observed in 
mandatory disclosure rules for the extractive industries, which are currently addressed in the EITI.  
Both the U.S. (Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010) and subsequent 
SEC rule which was judicially vacated))164 and EU (Accounting Directive)165, have sought to expand 
certain disclosures under EITI practice.166 It should be noted that the Dodd-Frank transparency rule 
was repealed in 2017.167   
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Another example of government efforts to regulate self-regulation can be observed in an Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) harmonisation initiative.  The ECOWAS 
harmonisation effort is intended to“[s]trengthen and consolidate the project to harmonize policies and 
mining codes in a context where the sub-region has the same mining resources and faces the same 
multinationals”.168  EITI actions are among the standards included in the ECOWAS review. 
Regulatory intervention by government may not always be a feasible option to address industry’s 
ineffective self-regulation. First, government must have the capability/expertise and appetite to 
enforce infringements, which it may not have, particularly in developing world nations where 
resources are a challenge.169 Second, foreign investment liberalisation means many in-country 
resource companies are multinationals, and may be subject to minimal state control.170 Corporate 
operations are often decentralised, with headquarters and stock exchange listings in countries different 
to that of the energy project operations, which has the effect of minimising accountability at the local 
level.  The independence of multinationals may make regulatory enforcement (including sanctions) 
difficult, with the multinational entity having domestic domicile merely ‘on paper’.171   
 
What is the answer when self-regulation and government regulation are ineffective?  Hybrid soft law 
regulatory models may provide solutions, such as those that involve the participation of industry and 
government, such as PPPs.172 
 
5: Colombia: The SLO in the Mining-Energy sector. 
 
The Mining-Energy sector has been one of the main drivers of the Colombian economy during the last 
thirteen years173, particularly when the commodities prices were higher (2011-2014)174. Although the 
Colombian Government has adjusted its macroeconomic strategy to incentivise other sectors of the 
economy to be less dependent on the hydrocarbons prices175, they have still strongly supported the 
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Mining-Energy sector, particularly the offshore industry176 due to the limited oil reserves (roughly five 
years more)177.         
 
Nevertheless, it seems that the Mining-Energy sector does not have the acceptance of some part of the 
society and some local authorities (governments). From 2013178, there have been a great number of 
consultation processes where local communities have rejected the exploitation of mines and 
hydrocarbons in their territories.179 This issue has been further emphasised in highly unforeseen 
outcome where in Cajamarca’s, the local community voted against perhaps one of the potentially 
largest mine gold in South America180 in a striking outcome: 97,92 percent voted ‘no’ to the 
development in the polls181. This number is surprising given the pre-existing investment of USD $19 
million of Anglo Gold Ashanti’s Corporate Social Responsibility expenditure in Cajamarca182 and the 
USD $900 million invested by the same Company since 2006 in Colombia183. After this precedent, 44 
municipalities from 1101184 have intentions to follow the same similar strategy, and ban petroleum 
and mining projects in their territories through popular consultations; there are 15 initiatives to 
prohibit petroleum projects and 26 more to forbid mining activities.185 
 
However, a number of questions arise, why are these municipalities (i.e. local governments) appealing 
to a popular consultation to reject extractive industries in their territories? Are the Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) or Sustainable Development Strategies (SDS) of the extractive companies not 
working? And why there is a constantly clash among the Central Government, Local Authorities and, 
also, the Judicial system regarding the extractive and petroleum regulation?  
 
The problem in Colombia is the lack of energy justice in the energy sector. The use of the land and the 
subsoil186; environmental care187; allocation of royalties188; local content189; mining informality190; 
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sustainable development and extreme poverty191; and legal stability192 are all part of the main reasons 
for the problems in the Mining-Energy sector in Colombia. Some communities in Colombia in 
essence want to see more the application of justice principles of distribution, procedural, and 
recognition in their energy sector and the application of restorative justice during the lifespan of an 
energy project. These communities are claiming that the national energy policies shall include their 
principal needs, interests and concerns. For instance, some experts193 argued that the feeling of local 
people is that the Government does not involve and include them from the beginning of the projects 
and, also, that there is a disconnection between the licensing process of a mining right and the 
planning of the use of the land. As a result, communities want their own agreement in place before 
energy development occurs. In essence what they advocate for as will be demonstrated in below in the 
section is an SLO with the company engaging in the activity. 
 
In this section, the development of a SLO system in the energy sector is explored. Its’ background is 
through the law and the Constitutional High Court positions as is identified below and a number of 
key stages in its development are outlined in the proceeding sections. 
 
5.1.  Stage 1 - Legal structural division between the land and the sub-soil   
 
By contrary to the United States, in Colombia, oil and gas does not belong to the owner of the land or 
to the person that is capable to capture the hydrocarbons194. Therefore, in Colombia, the ownership of 
petroleum relies on the State. However, the State, in this context, is an abstract concept because it 
does not specify the public entity that is entitled to claim dominion over the non-renewable natural 
resources195. This lack of clarity is still more problematic in a polarised country where there is a 
constant tension between the Local Governments (Territorial Entities) and the Central Government 
over the benefits (royalties) gained by the exploitation of natural resources even though both public 
entities are obliged to cooperate to fulfil their goals. This tension is better illustrated due to the 
negotiation power that each entity has over the other. Hence, this first stage will briefly address how 
the political division in Colombia can affect the ownership of hydrocarbons in Colombia.           
 
Territorial Entities are completely independent to manage and govern their territories. Colombia is a 
social state organised as a “unitary decentralized republic with policy centralization and 
administrative decentralization”196. Thus, the Territorial Entities (Departments, Regions, 
Municipalities and Indigenous territories) are completely autonomous of the political centralisation 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
188 María Paula Rubiano, ‘Así explotó el “boom” de las consultas populares’, El Espectador Journal, 
<http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/medio-ambiente/asi-exploto-el-boom-de-las-consultas-populares-
articulo-695826> accessed on 18 July 2017. 
189 Oscar Villadiego, Se equivocó Cajamarca?, El Tiempo Journal, 
<http://www.eltiempo.com/opinion/columnistas/oscar-villadiego-medina/se-equivoco-cajamarca-104488> 
accessed on July 18 2017. 
190 Centro Regional de Empresas y Emprendimientos Regionales, CREER, ‘Evaluacion Integral Sectorial de 
Impactos en Derechos Humanos, La Minería que no se vé’, Institute for Human Rights and Business, 2016, 73. 
191 United Nations Development Program, ‘Programas en beneficio de las comunidades implementados por el 
sector de Hidrocarburos en Colombia, Línea de Base’, Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos website 
<http://www.anh.gov.co/Seguridad-comunidades-y-medio-
ambiente/Documents/L%C3%ADnea%20de%20base%20PBC.pdf> accessed on 18 July 2017. 
192 El Tiempo Journal, <http://www.eltiempo.com/economia/sectores/consultas-populares-en-colombia-que-
tienen-en-vilo-la-explotacion-minera-y-petrolera-95600> accessed on July 18 2017. 
193 Luis Alvaro Pardo Becerra, Economist and Mauricio Cabrera, World Wildlife Fund WWF, El Tiempo 
Journal <http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/rechazo-a-la-mineria-en-las-consultas-populares-
107078>  19 August 2017. 
194 Bruce Kramer and Owen Anderson, ‘The rule of capture – an oil and gas perspective’, Environmental law, 
2005, <https://ttu-ir.tdl.org/ttu-ir/bitstream/handle/10601/582/Kramer%2035%20Envtl.pdf?sequence=1> 
195 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, c-006/1993, M.P. Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz 
196Procolombia, “Investment Booklet 2015, growth, confidence and opportunities to invest”, 
<https://www.slideshare.net/pasante/investment-booklet-2015> accessed on 20 July 2017. 
26 
power of the Executive Branch at Central Level197. For instance, the definition of the use of the land is 
a competence exclusively delegated to Territorial Entities198. Even more, is because of such 
independence that the allocation of competences between both levels requires a specific procedural 
law (ley orgánica de ordenamiento territorial)199. 
 
The ownership of the non-renewable resources resources and the sub-soil relies on the State200. 
However, what is the meaning of the State? Is the State similar than the Nation? The State includes all 
the public entities whereas the Nation is associated exclusively with Central Authorities201. Bearing in 
mind these concepts, it is important to emphasise that the Constitution interestingly avoided granting 
the benefits of the natural resources exploitation either in favour of the Executive Branch at Central 
Level (Nation) or Territorial Entities202. Notwithstanding, the National Congress is entitled to regulate 
the exploitation of the natural resources and delegate by law the direction or intervention of the sub-
soil in the Central Government203.  
 
As a result, it is clear that the constituent assembly of 1991 did not want to gather all the wealth of the 
natural resources exploitation neither in the Nation nor in the Local Authorities because the 
decentralised spirit of the Constitution. By contrary, the constituent assembly expressly made a 
structural separation between the governance of the land and the governance of the sub-soil. The 
former (land) is delegated to Territorial Entities whereas the latter (sub-soil) is transferred to the 
Congress, which in turn, can delegate it to the Central Level. Nonetheless, constitutionally, both 
public entities (Local and Central) are obliged to cooperate in order to reach their objectives 
regardless of any disparity of functions204. In essence, one cannot operate without the other’s 
permission. 
 
However, is this structural division sustainable in practice when, for instance, extracting mineral 
resources can affect the ‘surface’?205 This is addressed in the next section. 
 
5.2.  Stage 2 - An attempt to regulate the Territorial Entities competences through a Mining 
Code: it was necessary? 
 
Arguably, a key point of this controversy about the surface and the sub-soil regulation emerged with 
the Article 37 of the Mining Code introduced in 2001. This provision pointed out that no regional, 
sectional or local authority can exclude permanently or provisionally from their territories mining 
activities; in other words, Territorial Entities were not entitled to ban mining activities through the 
planning of the use of the land. This provision favoured energy development without considering the 
interests of Territorial Entities. Consequently, a great number of a constitutional citizen actions 
emerged against this provision.  
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Since then, the Constitutional Court has explored the constitutionality of this provision on three 
occasions with different outcomes. In 2012, the provision was declared as valid in the context that it 
was in the public interest that there is mining activity. In 2014, however, there was a trend that 
marked to beginning of the development of the equivalent of a SLO: the provision would still remain 
valid but on the basis that a settlement shall be agreed between the National Government and the 
Local Authorities (administrative coordination principle) regarding the environmental activities and 
protection from the mining activity.206 
 
In 2016, the Constitutional Court, however, abolished the provision on the basis of two major points: 
(1) the need to protect the competence of Territorial Entities and (2) the obligation to preserve the 
rights of the society as well as the environment.   
 
The high court concluded that the Mining Code article limited the autonomy and competences of 
Territorial Entities and was inconsistent with procedural law. The Mining Code was not the 
appropriate law to regulate or affect the competences of Territorial Entities. This is because Territorial 
Entities competences can only be affected or regulated by a particular law (ley orgánica) which is 
almost at the same level of the constitution and its provisions shall remain permanent in the time. The 
Mining code, in contrast, was passed as a law of lower category (ley ordinaria) into the Congress207. 
Subsequently, the Mining code could not abolish and took over the competences of a law of higher 
hierarchy i.e. ‘ley orgánica’208. One of the main reasons for this special protection is that the Congress 
when is regulating the competences of Territorial Entities by a ‘ley orgánica’ makes a stronger and 
robust democratic process (for example absolute majority) than when is issuing a ‘ley ordinaria’ 
(Mining code)209. 
 
In addition, another pivotal point of the High Court to abolish the provision of the Mining Code was 
that the Central Government through the national mapping mining activity can impact the 
competences of Territorial Entities to regulate the economic activity of their territories.  
 
Environmental care and society rights supported also the decision to abolish the Mining Code 
provision. Taking into account a former judgment (C-123/2014), the Court interestingly reaffirmed 
that during the licensing mining process the Central and the Local Government shall harmonise their 
interests and agree measures to protect the environment; the water reservoirs; the sustainable 
development of communities; the constitutional rights of indigenous people; the individuals; the 
economic activity of territories; and lastly but not less important it should preserve the autonomy of 
the Territorial Entities.210  
 
In conclusion, until May 2016, one should arguably conclude that the Central Government and Local 
Governments shall first make efforts to reach an agreement on the measures of environmental 
protection and sustainable development during the process of issuing a mining right211. If there is still 
a collision of competences between both entities (no settlement), the Congress shall then resolve the 
controversy by issuing a particular law (ley organica).  
 
5.4.  Stage 3 - The state of the art: people are choosing but do they have the last world? 
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Strikingly, in August 2016, the Constitutional High Court made a new judgment where expressly gave 
the power to Territorial Entities to forbid mining projects as part of the communities right to be 
consulted where there is an initiative of developing a mining project. Therefore, this sub-chapter will 
explain how the Social License to Operate could be accepted or rejected through popular 
consultations.  
 
There has been a constitutional shift in Colombia which is best encapsulate by the following quote: 
“The former constitution declared that sovereignty rested on the Nation while the new one states that 
sovereignty lies on the People”.212 This further supports the use of popular consultations to define the 
economic activities of territories. For instance, Cajarmarca’s people opted for agricultural activities 
instead of gold whilst Cumaral’s people opted for stockbreeding of livestock instead of hydrocarbons. 
However, are these outcomes legally binding? This subsection considers legal cases that have arisen. 
 
Popular consultation’s outcome is binding and they are enforceable by law. From 1994, the authorities 
are obliged to respect the results of popular consultation. Indeed, Territorial Entities are particularly 
obliged to conduct a popular consultation when a mining project transforms the economic activity of a 
territory213. However, what is a popular consultation and why its outcome is binding? Popular 
consultation is a constitutional citizen democratic right214, in which, the people express their consent 
or not regarding to a specific question that is related with affairs of the Central or Local level, 
respectively215. If the outcome in the polls is positive, another public entity is obliged to adopt the 
people’s decision in an independent law which can be subject of further constitutional analysis.  
Therefore, the people’s decision in a popular consultation is binding on the basis of the fulfilment of 
the legal minimum requirements216.  
 
Particularly, the outcome of popular consultations in mining projects are binding not only by law but 
also because the hazards that mining projects can have on the environment and society. In August 
2016, the Constitutional Court in a judgment issued in August 2016  –‘Liliana Mónica Flores Arcila’ 
against ‘Tribunal Administrativo del Quindío’217- confirmed the binding and enforceability of these 
actions regarding a specific popular consultation against mining activities (Pijao municipality). Two 
main reasons supported the decision. First, the binding nature of the people’s decision as was 
explained in the paragraph above, and, second, the need to protect specific rights (agricultural 
workers and the environment) against the almost certain damages that result from mining activity218. 
In the judgment mentioned above, the Constitutional Court declared that mining activities affect 
significantly communities rights; the supply and right to food219; the public order within one 
municipality220; other industries221; the environment of the municipalities; and the economic industry 
of the territory222.  
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Consequently, the Court223 expressly returned the decision-making power back to communities. As 
the development of a mining project can impact the competences of local territories and directly 
impacts local communities224, communities are entitled to participate and express its opinion about the 
allowance or not of mining activities225. Consequently, Territorial Entities are nowadays entitled to 
ban mining projects226.  
 
However, can this decision promote more adversarial and extreme positions between Central 
Government and Local Governments?  
 
As was explained in the stage 2, the same Constitutional Court (C-123/2014 and C-273/16) 
highlighted the cooperation principle between public entities as well as the procedural law (ley 
organica) to overcome any collision of competences to balance two tensions: on the one hand, the 
need to allocate or spread the economic benefits of an extractive project in all the Colombian 
territories and, on the other, the need to preserve the self-governance of Local Authorities over their 
territories227. Nonetheless, with the new judgment of the High Court (August 19 of 2016), Local 
Authorities are entitled to forbid the development of mining projects. Therefore, one should conclude 
that until a new bill is passed into the Congress, mining companies shall have a previous consent from 
the community to start exploration activities in one territory.   
  
Nowadays, there is a governmental initiative to regulate at the earliest consultation to avoid eventual 
suspension of the Mining-Energy activity, as a result of some investors claiming for damages and 
legal stability228. For example, TobieMining-Cosigo (Canada) made an international arbitration 
lawsuit of USD 16.500 million arguing that they have not received any compensation due to the 
impossibility to develop a mining right in the ‘Yaigojé-Apaporis’ natural reserve, which is a special 
protected area of 1 million hectares of virgin jungle as well as it is a sacred place for Indigenous 
people (origin of life)229. Additionally, AnglogoldAshanti has argued the need for having legal 
stability as a result of the decisions made by Local Authorities in which the latter have banned mining 
projects230.  
 
5.5.  Gaining a Social License to Operate  
 
Generally, extractive industries develop their “Sustainable Development” or “Corporate Social 
Responsibility” (CSR) strategies under the concept that “without private sector wealth creation there 
can be no significant reductions in poverty”231. However, extractive industries arguably “often fail to 
emphasise why resource companies might want to contribute in such a way (poverty reduction)”232. 
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In Colombia, contract law has become a quintessential device to perform social public policy and to 
deliver Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs to reduce poverty with enormous 
investments. These social programs are performed trough inter-administrative agreements or by 
public and private association agreements with non-profit organisations. For instance, in 2012, two 
different memorandum of understanding were signed by the Colombian Central Government, the 
Mining Industry and the Hydrocarbons sector to overcome extreme poverty in Colombia under an 
‘ethical and social mandate’ to tackle it233. Furthermore, from 2012 to 2016, the National Oil and Gas 
Company, Ecopetrol, had invested £ 261.866.750 in social investment programs in health, education, 
productive projects, infrastructure and environmental care234 Despite this noticeable investment and 
this CSR’s strategies, communities and indigenous people are still protesting against extractive 
industries235.   
 
Harvey suggests a shift from ‘Outreach’ (particularly the bad-outreach) to ‘In-reach’ approach236. 
Applying an out-reach approach imply that the Social License to operate is an external affair of the 
company. In contrast, an in-reach approach involves that the Social License to operate is a “business-
connected” activity that it is in the business core. This shifting generates a change within the 
conventional transactional Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) or analogously concepts, from a 
transactional model of compensation or kind of gifts to a process where “trust”, “respect” and “local 
induction” are the main foundations of a lasting relationship between communities and industries237.  
 
One can restate Harvey’s key points in the following terms238:  
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Consequently, the Harvey’s proposal is to create a kind of a partnering between the communities and 
the extractive industries to work “on a face to face basis” on the major concerns of the people; the 
goal is that these fears or issues are highly connected with business activity of the Company instead of 
being as an external affair.  
 
5.6.  Conclusion 
 
Constitutionally, the regulation of the sub-soil and the governance of the surface is allocated in two 
public entities; the former (sub-soil) relies on the Congress which can delegate it to the Central 
Government whereas the latter (surface) relies on Territorial Entities. However, the Constitutional 
Court has challenged, in practice, this division mostly in the mining sector due to environmental 
concerns and the potential change of economic productivity in territories. 
 
This challenge arises due to the lack of coordination to govern the non-renewable natural resources 
exploitation inside the State, at both central and local levels. Therefore, this tension has likely 
activated the people’s sovereignty as a manner of solve this collision of competences239, which has 
been expressed through more than five popular consultations to forbid mining-petroleum activities 
and 44 intentions to follow the same tendency.  
 
The challenge now is to harmonise not only the competences of the State over the natural resources as 
well as to consider the people’s right to be considered in the decisions that may affect their territories. 
As a result, until the Congress introduce a new law (ley organica) solving the tension between the 
Central Government and Local Governments, one thesis is arguably emerging in Colombia: 
community consent is a condition to being awarded a mining right as well as a hydrocarbon license. 
Despite that there is not a legal provision that expressly requires community acceptance to exploit 
non-renewable natural resources, i.e. a “Social License to Operate” as an equivalent to the 
Environmental License, this consent will be required if there is a potentially impact or hazard that 
affect the society, the environment and the economic activity of one territory240. This consent can be 
achieved whether by a popular consultation promoted by communities or local authorities or by 
individual negotiation among the oil companies, the State and communities. 
 
However, there is also an important role that extractive industries and petroleum enterprises can 
develop in this scenario: self-regulation of their power.   
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It seems reasonable to suggest that actually in Colombia the SLO should be the first point in the 
agenda in the ‘Check List’ of an Energy Project. The profitability of a project will be significantly 
affected by whether it obtains an SLO or not. For instance, 92 of Ecopetrol’s production wells were 
suspended in May 2017 due to community protests and other 81 production wells also were ceased in 
June 2017 with a loss of 9.500 oil barrel per day because an incident with indigenous people241. 
Furthermore, Anglo Gold Ashanti has suspended operations in Cajamarca as the outcome of the 
popular consultation242.  
 
Subsequently, it seems a fair suggestion that extractive industries and petroleum companies should 
have obtained and retained a “Social License to Operate” for the lifecycle of their projects; the same 
outcome will happen whether the company is under public or private ownership. It is important that 
energy companies are more proactive on the SLO issue, and that they disclose, discuss and consider 
their interest to intervene a territory at the earliest stage possible of the project. Ensuring the company 
has an SLO before committing huge investments in exploration activities meet a company’s other 
obligations to sustainable development or corporate social responsibility, all key strategies for a 
company to realise when engaging in new energy activities. 
 
To restate, nowadays the society is entitled to accept or reject an extractive project in Colombia as a 
result of the disconnection inside the State. This participation right is supported by the Constitutional 
Court243 that returned the decision-making power back to communities until the Congress through a 
particular law will balance the tension of gaining royalties from the extractive industry to be allocated 
in all the Country or preserving the autonomy of Territorial Entities to decide the future in their 
territories.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
SLO is an emerging necessary tool for achieving effective and sustainable outcomes for both the 
extractive industries as well as affected communities244. It needs a clearer definition to give it more 
prominence. The proliferation of terms that cover SLO’s as set out in table 1 require consolidation. 
This would provide greater clarity in understanding the necessary role of SLO’s for energy 
companies. The increasing contractual nature of SLO’s leads us to the supposition that this 
consolidation is inevitable. Companies can no longer assume that the introduction of their activities 
will be perceived as uniquely benefiting communities in the form of financial incentives or 
employment 245. The SLO mechanism recognises that energy-related industries and communities must 
enter into a deeper negotiated understanding as early as possible.  
 
The Columbia example raised in this paper demonstrates the risks in assuming that communities will 
accept readily energy-related activities undertaken by energy companies. It also pointed towards the 
instability of considering the important role played by courts or other intermediaries where rights of 
communities can usurp the needs of energy companies as we see in stage three of the Columbia study. 
The SLO can provide a helpful framework for avoiding such disputes if implemented in a 
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comprehensive manner 246. It reminds us that the social and legal licence to operate cannot exist in 
separation. They are necessarily interconnected. An energy company must therefore consider both 
dimensions when proposing an energy project to avoid the experience outline in Colombia or indeed 
in other latin America examples 247. A failure to do so will lead to similar outcomes to Colombia. 
 
The SLO is a key instrument for achieving energy justice 248. The foundational principles of 
distributional, procedural and recognition justice underpin the SLO framework. It demands a more 
comprehensive appreciation of energy-related impacts as well as the preventative measures needed for 
successful mitigation. The focus of these principles is not to thwart energy activities 249. It is to ensure 
the long-term sustainability of energy investments. The ignorance of energy justice principles results 
in short-term unstable negative experiences with resisting communities 250. The contractual nature of a 
SLO can embed a two-way understanding of a fair and meaningful interaction between energy 
company and community leading to mutual benefits 251. The increasing level of energy investments 
makes this process invaluable. 
 
Procedural justice is enhanced through the application of a SLO. The establishment of mechanisms 
for allowing community engagement with energy companies is in keeping with the demands of a wide 
range of legal interventions in this area, the most prominent being the Arhus convention. This reminds 
us that the participation of affected communities in decisions made by energy companies must be 
accompanied by the right to access relevant information as well as ultimately recourse to justice in 
environmental matters. We highlighted the expansion of such rights through the consideration of 
impact assessment within a European context. In order to come in line with such advances, the SLO 
must reflect on all dimensions when considering what procedural justice means 252. 
 
The second component of energy justice is the adoption of a comprehensive approach to human 
rights. We outline above the ways in which such recognition could be expanded further when 
considering the implications of a given energy project. The current approach is to adopt the existing 
FPIC framework which remains too narrow in focus. Human rights must be considered more widely 
than indigenous considerations, as well as over the lifetime of a project (instead of the current “rubber 
stamp” understanding). The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights offers a more private 
company mechanism (rather than the state centric perspective of FPIC). This is a step in the right 
direction. A robust understanding of a SLO could further enhance this approach by expanding such 
considerations throughout the life-cycle of a company’s energy activities. 
 
Distributional justice is a final consideration in our paper. It is a common principle established in the 
energy justice literature. It often argues for the redistribution of benefits for affected communities. We 
argue that the standardisation of SLO terminology, alongside its increasingly contractual nature, could 
help communities understand where SLO’s have been successfully enacted. Its current opacity hinders 
the adoption of best practice. The current use of multiple terms leads to an unawareness of its 
potential for both companies and communities. This has led to an unequal distribution of rights to 
access SLO as a useful mechanism for avoiding the dispute. Individual components of the SLO 
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framework are currently implemented in a piecemeal approach. To achieve distributional justice, we 
must allow for the comprehensive and transparent adoption of best practice in SLO’s. 
 
 
 
